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PNEUMO ABEx CORP. v. HIGHPOINT, THOMASVILLE &
DENTON RAILROAD, AND CERCLA "ARRANGER
LIABILITY"
JASON C. KUHLMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Response,
Environmental
Comprehensive
The
U.S.C. §§
42
1980
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Act
of
Compensation, and Liability
- "any
others
among
on
liability
9601- 9696 (2000),' imposes
for
arranged
or
otherwise
agreement,
by
contract,
who
person
CERCLA
....
2
substances
hazardous
of
...
treatment
disposal or
liability is often not inexpensive. Certainly any rational corporate
decision-maker will take measures to avoid responsibility for a
contaminated site. One obvious way to achieve this goal is to
characterize a transaction in which waste or hazardous materials
change hands as a sale rather than a contract for treatment or disposal.
However, courts recognize this trick and display a
willingness to pounce on transactions unable to live up to their label.
Indeed, cases reveal that such a characterization meets with success if
and only if the court is convinced that the transaction is actually a
sale. 3 Thus, the obvious question presents itself: How does one
convince a court that the transaction in question was indeed a sale
and not a contract for the disposal or treatment of hazardous
substances? One finds no easy answer. As a number of courts have
pointed out, there is no "bright-line" test to delineate between a
legitimate sales contract and a contract for disposal or treatment
under CERCLA.4 Rather, courts employ a variety of factors to
analyze the specific facts of each case.5 This variance can cause the
search for a bright line to wind up in quite murky waters.
This Comment examines the recent Fourth Circuit decision
on this issue in Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville &
*Notes Editor, Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Law, J.D., cur
laude, 2001 University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. summa cum luade, 1998 University
of Kentucky.
'42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9696 (2000).
'Id. § 9607(a)(3).
3See United States v. Petersen Sand and Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (N.D.
II. 1992); see
4 also United States v. Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151, 156 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769,775
(4th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Petersen Sand and Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346,
1354 (N.D. II1.1992)).
sPneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775, with Pesses, 794 F. Supp. at 156, and

California v. Summer delCaribe, Inc.. 821 F. Supp. 574, 581 (N.D. Ca. 1993), and United
100 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (6th Cir. 1996).
States v. Cello-Foil Prod., Inc.,
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Denton R.R. 6 ("Pneumo Abex"). Part II explains the particular facts,
procedural history, and legal issues of Pneumo Abex. Part III
presents aspects of the broad concept of "arranger liability" under
CERCLA that are relevant to an understanding of the Pneumo Abex
decision. Part IV discusses the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the facts
of the Pneumo Abex case. Finally, part V of this Comment serves
two functions: First, it places the Pneumo Abex decision in the
context of other decisions in the Untied States in an attempt to glean
from the case the principles that relieved the defendants of liability;
second, it examines the Pneumo Abex court's treatment of the "useful
product" defense.
II. PNEUMO ABEX CORPORATION'S OPERATION, RESULTING
POLLUTION, AND QUEST FOR INDEMNIFICATION

A. Pneumo Abex Operations and Pollution
The predecessor to Pneumo Abex Corporation ("Pneumo
Abex"), Abex Corporation ("Abex"), operated a railroad parts
7
foundry in Portsmouth, Virginia, from 1927 to 1978. At this site,
8
Abex processed used journal bearings into new journal bearings,
9
pursuant to conversion agreements made with various railroads. In
exchange for shipping their used bearings to the foundry, the
railroads received credit toward the purchase of new bearings equal
of the used bearings, less any weight attributed to dirt or
to the weight
0
grease.'
After receiving the used bearings, Abex melted them down to
"'sweat off' dirt, grease, and any impurities to separate the back from
the lining."" During the melting process, impurities jose to the top
where Abex employees skimmed them off. This material, known as
"slag," was collected from the furnaces and ultimately deposited on
the back lot of the Abex foundry property. Additionally, Abex
collected the dust generated by this process and placed it in drums
eventually deposited on the back lot. Abex then 2used the molten
metal to create new bearings that it would later sell.1
Following the closing of the foundry in 1978, the EPA
sampled the soil on the back lot and discovered elevated levels of
6

Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775.

7

See id. at 772.

8

1d. at 772-73. ( "Journal or wheel bearings are used on railroad cars to hold

lubricating oil against the axle to reduce friction.
('babbitt') and a bronze or brass 'back'."). Id.
9
1d. at 773.

'Old.

"Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d. at 773. Id.
121d.

They are comprised of a lead lining
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lead, zinc, copper, tin, and antimony; the elements used in creating
new bearings.1 The EPA declared the premises a Superfund Site and
in 1986 Abex began response activities. Estimates from the EPA put
the total cost of the remedy at a minimum of $21 million. 14
B. Procedural Posture
The EPA contacted the Defendants (as part of a larger class
of 'potentially responsible parties" 5under CERCLA) for contribution
to the clean-up effort.' 6 While others cooperated with the EPA, the7
Defendants refused, denying responsibility for the response costs.'
Pneumo Abex then sued the Defendants under sections 107 and 113
of CERCLA. Is The District Court dismissed the section 113 action
as redundant and allocated responsibility under section 107.19 The
Defendants appealed the decision of the District Court, specifically
challenging the finding of liability, the standing of Pneumo Abex to
sue under section 107, the propriety of a suit for contribution by
Pneumo Abex under section 107, and the allocation of response
costs.20

The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo the issues of liability
and dismissal of the section 113 claim, and reviewed for abuse of
discretion the issues of standing and equity of the award. 2 The court
reversed the decision on the issue of liability of the defendants and
remanded the case back to the District Court to apportion response
costs among the remaining parties under section 113.22 Section 113,
the court pointed out, "must be used by parties who are themselves
potentially responsible parties,"
a category within which the court
23
indicated Pneumo Abex fell.
III.

RELEVANT ASPECTS OF "ARRANGER LIABILITY"

In an action for contribution under CERCLA, a plaintiff must
establish four elements. First, the site in question must be a "facility"
as defined in CERCLA section 101(9). Second, a plaintiff must show
that a "release" (or "threatened release") of any "hazardous
3

1 1d.

141Id.
I'ld.
at 773 n.2 ("While CERCLA does not define 'potentially responsible party', the
courts have 6understood it to refer to a party who may be covered by the statute ... ").
, Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d.at 773.
' 71d. at 773.
8d.
191d.
2

01d.
21Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d. at 773.
22
231d. at 776.
1d. at 776.
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24
substance" from the facility has occurred. Third, such release must
have caused the plaintiff to incur necessary response costs. Fourth,
one of the four classes" of covered
the defendant must fall "within
25
107(a).
section
persons in
Section 107(a) defines four categories of "covered persons"
subject to response cost liability. The so-called "arranger liability,"
defined in section 107(a)(3), creates liability in the following
category of persons:
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment,
or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such
26
hazardous substances,
27
but
CERCLA does not define the "disposal" or "treatment,
Solid
the
in
terms
those
to
given
definitions
the
rather references
28
SWDA defines "treatment" as
Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA").
including neutralization,
process,
or
technique,
method,
" ...any
biological character or
or
chemical,
physical,
the
change
to
designed
such waste or
neutralize
to
as
so
waste
hazardous
any
of
composition
for transport,
safer
non-hazardous,
waste
such
render
so as to
reduced in
or
storage,
for
amenable
recovery,
for
amenable29
volume.,

"Disposal" under SWDA means:
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping,
spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste
or hazardous waste into or on any land or
water so that such solid waste or hazardous
waste or any constituent thereof may enter the
environment or be emitted into the air or

Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.

24

1990); see also Summer del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 578; G.J. Leasing Co., Inc., 854 F.
1994).
Supp. 539, 557-58 (S.D 111.
5
2 Stevens Creek Assoc., 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1358-

'642 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2000).
"See id § 9601(29).
2
'1d. § 6901- 6992(k).
29

See id. § 6903(34).
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discharged into any waters, including ground
waters.30

The intent of CERCLA is not to punish those who sell useful
products that contain hazardous substances, rather it is to impose

liability on those who attempt to dispose of hazardous substances by
disguising the disposal transaction as a sale to avoid liability.3 Thus,

when the question of arranger liability arises in the context of an
alleged sale, courts will look beyond the characterization of the
transaction as a sale, and determine the true nature of a transaction.
A bona fide sale will not give rise to CERCLA liability. However, an

arrangement that is actually one for disposal or treatment of
hazardous substances will lead to a finding of liability.32
As numerous courts have noted, no "bright-line" exists to

distinguish a sale of goods from an arrangement for treatment or

disposal.33 Rather, courts rely on an examination of the facts of the

particular case to determine the true nature of the transaction. A
survey of case law reveals a non-uniform variety of factors to which

courts turn in order to make the all-important distinction.
For example, in United States v. Pesses,34 the court used the

following factors to establish liability in the alleged sale of hazardous
substances: the "'crucial decision' on how its substances are disposed
of or treated;" retained ownership of the substances and the authority

to control the way the substances are disposed of or treated; and35

knowledge that the buyer will dispose of the substances there.
36
However in FloridaPower & Light Co. v. Allis Chambers Corp.,
the Eleventh Circuit, in rejecting a "per se" rule of liability, held that
"even though a manufacturer does not make the critical decisions as
to how, when, and by whom a hazardous
substance is to be disposed,
37
the manufacturer may be liable."

3"See id. § 6903(3).
3'Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Prod. Co., 906 F.2d 1059, 1065 (5th
Cir. 1990).

32See Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1354; Pesses, 794 F. Supp. at
156; Pneuno Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775 (quoting Petersen Sand & Gravel. Inc., 806 F.
Supp. at 1354); Summer del Caribe. Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 581; Cello-Foil Prod.. Inc., 100 F.3d
at 1231-32.
"3See Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775 (quoting Petersen Sand& Gravel, Inc.,
806 F. Supp. at 1354).
34794 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
351d. at 156, accord Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F.
Supp. 1269, 1274-75 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding defendants liable as arrangers for treatment and
disposal of clean up costs because they made the decision to sell spent lead acid batteries to the
operator of the contaminated site).
6
" 893 F.2d 1313 (1 Ith Cir. 1990).
"Id. at 1318, accord United States v. Summit, 805 F. Supp. 1422 (N.D. Ohio 1992)
(holding sellers of used equipment at "blind auction" to scrap dealers liable).
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The Eighth Circuit, however, dispenses with any control
requirement where the defendant retains ownership of the
contaminants. 38 In the Sixth Circuit, it has been held that the
"requisite inquiry is whether the party intended to enter into a
transaction that included an 'arrangement for' the disposal of
39
The Sixth Circuit considers its approach
hazardous substances."
consistent with the Seventh Circuit's "intentional action"
requirement, 40 which construes the phrase "arranged for" as implying
intentional action. 4 As is discussed more fully below, the Fourth
Circuit in Pneumo Abex resorted to the following factors: whether the
parties intended to reuse the products entirely, the value of the
materials 42sold, and the utility of the materials in their present
condition.
Another important concept in "arranger liability" that is
43
subject to differing applications is the "useful product" defense.
Some courts formulate this to apply only to "new and useful"
products. 44 Other courts give this concept a more liberal application
45
by not requiring that the product in question be new. For example,
in G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Electric Co.,46 the court said, "[t]he sale
of a useful product, even though the product contains a hazardous
substance, does not constitute a 'disposal' subjecting the seller to
CERCLA liability... Moreover, even if the 'product' is not used for
the purpose originally intended but can be used for some collateral
purpose, liability will not be imposed...
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PNEUMOABEXCOURT

Of the four requisite factors that a plaintiff must prove to
48
establish a defendant's liability, the Fourth Circuit faced only one:
whether the defendant fell within one of the four classes of covered
49
In this case, the plaintiff attempted to
persons in section 107(a).
38United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 966 F. Supp. 1491, 1501 (E.D. Ark. 1997)
(citing United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375-82 (8th Cir- 1989)).
3
Cello-Foil Prod., Inc., 100 F.3d at 1231.
at 1232.
401d.
41
ld.
42
Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775.
43Summer Del Caribe Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 581.

44See id. ("The 'sale of a useful product defense' applies when the sale is of a new
product, manufactured specifically for the purpose of the sale, or of a product that remains
useful for its normal purpose in its existing state."). Id.
4t
See, e.g., United States v. Wedzeb Enter. Inc., 809 F. Supp. 646,656-57 (S.D. Ind.
1992); see also, Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Prod. Corp., 810 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (D. Minn.

1993).

, 854 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Ill. 1994), a/7'd, 54 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1995).
'71d. at 560.
5
" See cases cited supra note 24.
4

9Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 774.
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establish arranger liability under section 107(a)(3). 5 ° Specifically at
issue was whether the defendant railroads arranged for the treatment
51
of hazardous material by entering the conversion agreements.
The plaintiff's argument rested on the essential premise that
arranger liability attaches to parties who arrange for treatment of
52
hazardous materials whether or not those materials are also waste.
The Fourth Circuit rejected this assertion as a reading of the statute
that was too broad. 53 In looking at the definition of "treatment" as
provided by SWDA, the court determined that it presupposes
discard. 54 It pointed out that if the CERCLA authors did not intend to
incorporate the presupposition of discard into the statute, they had the
ability to, and indeed would have adopted their own definition.5 5
However, since the legislature declined to adopt a definition without
SWDA presupposition, the court could not adopt another
the inherent
56
definition.
Having established that treatment presupposes discard, the
Fourth Circuit next referenced a number of factors that other courts
had relied on in determining whether a transaction constituted a
discard of hazardous substances or a sale of valuable materials.5 7 The
list included the following: the intent of the parties as to whether the
materials were to be reclaimed and reused, or reused entirely; the
materials value; and the usefulness of the materials at the time of sale
based on their condition. 58 Noting, however, that no "bright line" test
existed to distinguish between the two types of transactions, the court
commenced a "fact-specific inquiry" into the true nature of the
transaction. 59 First, the Fourth Circuit examined the particular
process of creating new wheel bearings from used wheel bearings.
The court found particularly important the fact that the pollution
resulting from the creation of new bearings occurred regardless of60
whether the foundry melted down used bearings or virgin materials.
The removal of dirt and grease was incidental to the bearing creation

5

old.
Sl1d.
521d.
53

1d.

4

" Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 774.
55d
56
d
"Id. at 775.
58
d.
59

d.

60ld. While the melting of the bearings did in fact result in the production of dust and
slag that were later dumped on the back lot, removal of slag was necessary when using virgin
materials. Thus, the court found that the underlying purpose of the case was distinguishable
from that involved in Cadillac Fairview v. United States, 41 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1994), where the
transaction was consummated for the purpose of removing contaminants from styrene used in
the production of rubber. Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775.
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than the central purpose of the conversion
process, rather
6
agreements. '
Secondly, the hazardous materials were not the dirt and
62
grease, but rather the metal in the bearings themselves. The Fourth
Circuit likened this to cases involving a sale of a material contained
63
when sold, but becomes hazardous in use. The court cited as an
example the case of AM InternationalInc. v. InternationalForging
Equip. Corp.64 In that case, the Sixth Circuit held that a seller of
chemicals in drums did not arrange for disposal where the buyer
allowed the building containing the drums to deteriorate, causing the
65
As in AM Int'l, here this case
release of hazardous materials.
66
sold.
when
involved metal contained
Third, the court found the parties intended reuse of the used
67
The
wheel bearings in their entirety to create new wheel bearings.
the
for
railroads
the
pay
foundry
the
agreements provided that
the
of
dispose
to
foundry
the
pay
bearings, not that the railroads
68
in
railroads
the
to
granted
foundry
the
that
The credit
metal.
the
of
weight
the
to
proportional
was
bearings
exchange for the used
metal in the bearings. 69 The foundry deducted from the credit an
amount for the weight of dirt and grease; however, this deduction
7°
represented the weight of the impurities, not a fee for reclamation.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the parties contemplated that the
bearings constituted a "valuable product for which the foundry paid a
to sales
competitive price. ' 7' Thus, the railroads were parties
liability. 72
contracts, and not arrangers subject to CERCLA
Finally, the court remanded the case with instructions to
73
apportion liability under CERCLA section 113 rather than section
74
Section 107 provides that "any person" can recover all
107.
response costs from any responsible parties, whose liability is usually
allows recovery
joint & several.75 On the other hand, section 113
76
from "any other person" who is or may be liable. Parties who are
themselves potentially liable under CERCLA must use the latter
6'Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775.
'21d.
63

id.

F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1993).
14982
6

1d. at 999.

66Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775.
67
!d.
68

1d.

7

Pneumo Abex Corp.. 142 F.3d at 775-76.

72

1d. at 776.

"342 U.S.C. § 9613 (2000).
141d.
§ 9607.
75
id.
76

1d. § 9613.
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section.77 Since the plaintiffs in this case were potentially liable, the
Fourth Circuit held 78
that section 113 was the proper vehicle for
apportioning liability.
V.

THE IMPACT OF THE PANEUMOABEX DECISION

Liability, in "arranger liability" cases, involving alleged sales
of products is usually based on inquiries into the true nature of the
transaction. Thus, the result reached by the Fourth Circuit may not
establish a precedent that is applicable to a variety of fact patterns.
Moreover, since it is not a United States Supreme Court decision, the
influence of the Fourth Circuit's decision may be limited to the extent
that other federal circuits adhere to differing rationales. However,
this decision provides a sound limitation on "arranger liability"and an
insight into which factors are key to a finding of no liability.
The Fourth Circuit's determination that "treatment," as
defined in SWDA, presupposes discard 79 provides the foundation for
the rest of the opinion. Through this determination, the distinction
between a sale of valuable property and an arrangement for treatment
or disposal takes on great significance; a sale of a valuable
commodity by definition cannot be a discarding of material. In
rejecting the plaintiff's claim that "arranger liability" attaches
regardless of whether the substance is waste, 80 the Pneumo Abex
court reached a result consistent with the Northern District of Ohio in
United States v. Summit Equip. & Supplies, Inc.81 In Summit, the
District Court employed a different line of reasoning to reach the
same result. The court first noted the conscious legislative choice to
use the word "substance" instead of "waste" in section 107.82 From
this, the District Court deduced a "desire to prevent a manufacturer of
hazardous substances from one day disposing of its excess inventory
and then arguing that since the 'substances' had many other uses they
were not 'waste', and therefore no liability should attach. 83 The
negative implication of this reasoning is the conclusion reached by
the Pneumo Abex court: That when there is no element of disposal or
discard, the seller will not face CERCLA liability.

17Pneumo

Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 776.

781d.
9
7 1d. at 774.

8"Id.
"805 F. Supp. 1422 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
d
"Id. at 1432.
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A. Comparison to Cases Involving Sales of Similar Substances
With this groundwork laid, the "fact-specific inquiry" of the
court, placed in perspective with other decisions on this subject,
reveals essential principles that can work to relieve a defendant from
similar factual situations are
arranger liability. Two cases involving
8 4 and UnitedStates v. Pesses.8 5
Inc.
Caribe,
del
Summer
v.
California
In both cases, the courts imposed CERCLA liability on parties
dealing with materials of a similar nature to the bearings in Pneumo
Abex, and under similar arrangements as well. While these cases
involve many of the same elements found in Pneumo Abex, several
distinguishing points existed which led the Fourth Circuit to properly
conclude that the railroads were not "arrangers." First, the court
relied on the fact that the foundry reused entirely the same material
6
processes.8
involved in Pneumo Abex without any reclamation
Secondly, the court placed great weight on the fact that the bearings
were useful to the foundry in their existing state and did not require
87
any additional processing.
1. California v. Summer Del Caribe,Inc.
88
In California v. Summer Del Caribe, Inc., the Northern
District of California held a manufacturer of cans liable for arranging
for the treatment or disposal of solder dross, a by-product of the can
manufacturing process.89 The defendant sold the solder dross to a
metal reclamation facility that would process the material to recover
the reusable portion.90 The facility stored the unusable portion in onsite drums. 9' These drums, some of which had been buried, corroded
and permitted the solder dross to leak onto the site, causing
2
contamination of dangerous levels of zinc and lead. The court held
that the melting process to recover the reusable portion constituted a
change in the physical character of the solder dross, and thus was
93
Furthermore, the
"treatment" within the meaning of the statute.
burying of the unusable portion of the solder dross constituted a
"disposal. 9 4
u'821F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Ca. 1993).
F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
85794
6
8 Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775.
87id.

"821 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Ca 1993).
"Id. at 582.
9"Id. at 577. Only one-third of the solder dross could be reclaimed and reused. The
remaining two-thirds contained high levels of lead and zinc and was unusable.
91Id.

9id.
931d. at 580.
"Summer del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 580.
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The Court of the Northern District of California also rejected
the defendant's contention that it was selling a useful product, not
disposing of waste by-products. 95 The court stated that the defense
only applied to new products manufactured specifically for the
purpose of the sale, or a product still useful for its normal purposes in
its present form. 96 Citing the Pesses97 decision, among others, the
court pointed out that where, as here, the transaction is the sale of an
otherwise useless waste or by-product, courts
98 have consistently
declined to apply the "useful product" defense.
However, Summer Del Caribe is distinguishable from

Pneumo Abex despite both cases involving the use of melting
processes that led to the generation of hazardous materials later

contaminating the respective sites. While the processing of the solder
dross necessarily produced substantial waste, 99 the waste at issue in
Pneumo Abex consisted of dust incidental to the manufacturing

process itself. First, the dust resulted regardless of whether the
foundry used virgin materials or used bearings.'00

Secondly, the

amount of dust did not represent a substantial percentage of the total
weight of the bearings. 101 This illustrates the importance of the factor
of "intent of the parties to the contract as to whether the materials
were to be reused entirely or reclaimed and then reused."' 0 2 In
situations of the nature of these two cases, Pneumo Abex suggests
that where the treatment/processing/use of the materials sold involves

reclamation, a stronger case exists for "arranger liability" under
CERCLA.
This conclusion is consistent with a majority of arranger
liability case law involving reclamation.' °3 Notable among these is
the Eastern District of Virginia case, Chesapeake and Potomac

9'1d. at 581.
%Id.
97794 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
"Id.
"See id.at 577.
"See text accompanying note 60.
" While dust was produced from the melting process, no deduction from the credit
given to the railroads was taken for dust. By contrast, a deduction was taken for the weight of
the "slag" (dirt, grease and other impurities) that was skimmed off of the molten metal.
Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 773. Furthermore, this slag was not the hazardous material in
question, "the metals themselves were." Id. at 775.
102Id.
13See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Serv., 954 F. Supp. 1020 (M.D.
Pa. 1997) (holding broker of used batteries sold to lead reclamation facility as responsible
person subject to arranger liability under CERCLA), ef Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States,
34 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that sale of spent car batteries to lead reclamation plant
was arrangement for treatment). But see, RSR Corp. v. Avanti Dev. Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1037
(S.D. Ind. 1999) (holding lead plate reclaimer who contracted with secondary lead smelter to
remove and deliver lead from spent batteries responsible as seller of useful product, not
arranger for further treatment or disposal of spent batteries).

J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

Telephone Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co.1

[VOL. 16:1

4

The facts of that case are
C & R Battery ran a
cases.
reclamation
of
battery
representative
reclaimed lead from
that
facility"
"battery sawing and shredding
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batteries.
vehicle
commercial
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case.'0
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various
the
from
bulk
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The usual practice of the defendants was to collect batteries until
they accumulated such an amount to make it efficient to sell batteries
to a battery reclaimer, such as C & R.107 Upon delivery from the
defendants, the employees of C & R Battery would break the
batteries, drain the battery acid into an "acid pond" and remove the
lead plates. The lead plates0 8were stored on-site until they could be
sold to a secondary smelter.'
The Chesapeake and Potomac court held that the defendants

"arranged for the treatment and disposal of the lead" and thus "fell
well within the ambit of Section 107(a)."' 1 9 The court declined to fit
this case within the "useful product" line of cases, noting that the
defendant brought to its attention no cases holding that an otherwise
spent product containing hazardous substances was a useful product
it. 110
because the buyer could reclaim a hazardous substance from
The Chesapeake and Potomac court further pointed out that the
defendant's useful product argument i ll would have merit if it sold
still usable batteries to an entity which used them in its own
operations.' 12 However, the court concluded, "[t]he batteries were
dead; their sale to C & R Battery can only realistically be
characterized as an attempt to 'get rid of them.""'13 The court cited
United States v. Pesses 1 4 as confirming the validity of this
conclusion. 115

"4814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
"'1d.at 1271.

1061d.
7
"'
1d. at1272.
108 d.
tm
' Id.at1275-76.
"'Chesapeake and Potomac, 814 F. Supp. at 1275.

"the defendants' argument was that the "mere sale of raw materials, commodities
or products used in another company's manufacturing processes, generally does not constitute
'arranging for disposal.'

The Recycler Defendants sold useful, valuable material to C & R

Battery." Id.
"51d. This situation would not involve reclamation; rather, the buyer of the useful
batteries would be purchasing a product useful as a whole. Thus the court is concluding that it
would be a "useful product."
11d.
114794 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1992).

1'The court quotes the language of Pesses, stating that the scrap materials "could
not be used productively without processing." The significance of this statement is discussed
below. See infra notes 121-123.
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2. United States v. Pesses
United States v. Pesses" 6 involved an owner and operator of

a contaminated site in the business of obtaining scrap material
unusable for its intended purpose and processing the material to make
it productive."17 The defendants in the case allegedly arranged for the
disposal or treatment of hazardous materials by sending their
materials to the site.1 8 However, the defendants contended that they
sold valuable scrap material to the site that was used by the operator
either in his manufacturing processes or for resale. 19 The defendants
further asserted that since they did not retain ownership or control
over the materials, and since the processing of the materials was not
"treatment,"20 they did not arrange for the disposal or treatment of the
materials.
The court of the Western District of Pennsylvania disagreed,
finding that the flow of monetary consideration was not dispositive of
the issue.'12 Furthermore, it found that the materials sent to the
operator of the site could not be used for their intended purpose, nor
for any productive purpose absent processing.122 In the court's view,
such processing constituted both "treatment" under CERCLA 23 as
well as "disposal" since the incidental
24 wastes generated from the
processing were dumped on the land. 1
Pesses presents a scenario strikingly similar to that of
Pneumo Abex. Neither the scrap in Pesses, nor the bearings in
25
Pneumo Abex were useful for their originally intended purposes.'
However, the Pesses court also found that the scrap could not be
"productively used" without undergoing what the court held to be
treatment as defined under CERCLA. 126 This provides perhaps the
subtle, but key distinction from the Pneumo Abex decision. Unlike
the scrap in Pesses, the wheel bearings could be productively used by
the Abex foundry without any extra treatment in the creation of new

'16794 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
1"Pesses, 794 F. Supp. at 154. The scrap materials received at this site included

"used or discarded parts and equipment, waste sludges, metallic by-products from industrial
operations," as well as nickel cadmium batteries. Id.
'Id. at 155.
1]91d
2
1 0 1d
1

121d. at 156.
2
12Pesses, 794 F. Supp. at 156-57.
23

1 1d. at 157. The court held that the "melting, shearing, cleaning, crushing, sawing,
banding, drilling, tapping, briquetting, and baling" of the materials fit within the SWDA
definition of "treatment."
124'd.
25

1 In Pesses, the operator of the site testified that it was his business to obtain scrap
that was not usable for its intended purpose. Id.
126ld"
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bearings. 27 Melting down bearings to use in the manufacturing
process involved no additional effort and no more increased resulting
pollution than using virgin materials. 128 This difference illustrates the
importance of the usefulness of the bearings in their existing state. If
there had been a need for additional "melting, shearing, cleaning,
crushing, sawing, banding, drilling, tapping, briquetting, [or]
baling" 129 of the bearings before they could be incorporated into a
new product, the Pneumo Abex court might have been more willing
to find the requisite discard element of "treatment."
To summarize, when compared to similar cases from other
federal circuits, two factors emerge from the Pneumo Abex decision
as particularly important in avoiding "arranger liability." First, where
the transaction contemplates reusing a product in its entirety rather
than reclaiming a component of a dangerous product, there exists a
stronger case for non-liability. Second, although a product being sold
may no longer be useful for its intended purpose, liability may still be
avoided if it can be put to some use without any additional
processing.
B. "Useful Product" Defense
The Fourth Circuit's ultimate determination of whether the
conversion agreements between the Abex foundry and the railroads
were arrangements for disposal or treatment, or sales of usefulproducts, represents a broader view of the "useful product" defense.
As noted above, many jurisdictions limit its application to cases
involving products considered new and useful. 130 Of course, in
Pneumo Abex, the railroads sold worn out wheel bearings not useful
for their intended purpose.' 31 However, as to the purpose of casting
new wheel bearings, their worth was virtually on par with that of
similar virgin materials. Thus, one party considered the bearings
useful (the foundry), but the other party did not (the railroads). This
raises two questions left unanswered by the court. First, does the
127The District Court's opinion from this case helps clarify this. The bearings were
first heated to remove the impurities and then melted. Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer & Lake
Erie R.R. Co., 921 F. Supp. 336, 340 (E.D. Va. 1996). However, as the Fourth Circuit found,

both the removal of impurities and the melting of the metal to be molded into new bearings
would have been necessary if virgin materials had been used. Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at

775.

2

' 6pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 775.
29
13 Pesses, 794 F. Supp. at 157.
'DSummer del Caribe,Inc.,
821 F. Supp. at 581,

13'The lower court's opinion is enlightening on this. "The Association of American
Railroads ("AAR") established specifications for journal bearings. Railroad inspectors
determine when railroad companies need to replace journal bearings because they are broken or
worn." Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 921 F. Supp. 336,339-40 (E.D.

Va. 1996). Therefore, the railroads would accumulate old bearings no longer fit for use on the
railroad cars.
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Fourth Circuit subscribe to the broader application of the "useful
product" doctrine? Secondly, when evaluating the merits of a party's
useful products defense, from whose perspective is "useful"
considered?
As to the first question, the court of the Southern District of
Indiana in the case of RSR Corp. v. Avanti Dev., Inc., recognized the
Pneumo Abex decision as part of an emerging trend to apply "useful
product" more broadly as "new and useful" construction.132 There,
the court stated that the trend in the Eighth Circuit employs the "more
appropriate" analysis involving evaluating a product's marketability,33
and the consumer demand for the good, not just its functionality.'
As it related to the scrap metal in controversy in that case, the court
said, "[t]he question therefore is not whether the lead plates were still
useful as originally intended, but whether
they were a commercially
34
valuable product at the time of sale." 1
Assuming that the Avanti court provides the correct answer to
the first question, it follows that the answer to the second question is
that if the product is useful to either party to the transaction, then the
transaction is properly considered a sale of a useful product. One
must wonder if an expansion of the "use product" defense can be
consistent with the broad liability of CERCLA, which holds liable all
persons along the causal chain. 35 Under this trend, could proper
drafting of sales contracts allow parties to contract out of CERCLA
liability? Could the useful product defense to arranger liability
subsume the rule of arranger liability itself? Or, will the fact-specific
inquiry preserve the integrity of arranger liability? It appears to be
too early to know. Until a pronouncement is made by the United
States Supreme Court, only the treatment of the Pneumo Abex
decision by future courts will provide the answers.

32

1 RSR Corp., 68 F. Supp. 2dat 1045 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
33
1 1Id.
34

1 1d.
'W'OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574,1578 (5th. Cir.
1997) (citing B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d. Cir. 1992)).

